Inside the collapsing local revenue streams and mounting expenses that cut short Martin Jarmond's Big Ten vision.
UCLA fired athletic director Martin Jarmond on Aug. 31, less than two years after the conference move he helped build began delivering the money UCLA wanted. Big Ten media rights brought the Bruins $61.2 million in fiscal 2025, more than triple the $19.9 million from their final Pac-12 year. UCLA Athletics still reported $173.4 million in expenses against $151.8 million in revenue and finished $21.6 million short.
Chancellor Julio Frenk called the department’s financial path “not sustainable” when he announced Jarmond’s exit. The timing makes the firing a useful test of UCLA’s Big Ten decision. Conference money improved the books, but UCLA still relied heavily on campus support while several revenue streams it had to generate for itself moved in the wrong direction.
UCLA’s First Big Ten-Year Financial Snapshot
| Measure | Figure | Why it is useful |
|---|---|---|
| Big Ten media rights | $61.2M | More than triple the final Pac-12 year |
| Reported athletics revenue | $151.8M | Includes $31.1M in direct university support |
| Athletics expenses | $173.4M | Exceeded reported revenue by $21.6M |
| Previous annual deficit | $51.9M | FY2024, before the first full Big Ten fiscal year |
| Seven-year reported shortfalls | $241.1M | Cumulative annual deficits, not the same as a current unpaid bill |
Big Ten Money Solved One Part of UCLA’s Problem
UCLA’s financial trouble started years before its first Big Ten game. Athletics lost more than $100 million across fiscal 2019, 2020 and the pandemic-hit 2021 fiscal year. When then-Chancellor Gene Block and Jarmond announced the Big Ten move in June 2022, they tied the decision to financial stability and the future of UCLA’s 25 varsity teams and more than 700 athletes.
They wrote that the move would give UCLA “greater certainty in rapidly changing times” and provide more resources for athlete support. UCLA expected $65 million to $75 million a year in Big Ten media-rights revenue, plus conference distributions tied to postseason football and NCAA competition.
The first full year delivered much of that promise. Media-rights revenue reached $61.2 million, while nearly $13 million more came from conference postseason and NCAA distributions. Conference and NCAA revenue together reached $77.3 million in fiscal 2025.
The annual deficit also fell from $51.9 million in fiscal 2024 to $21.6 million one year later. If you looked only at the conference checks, the move would look close to the financial rescue UCLA expected. The picture changes once the $31.1 million UCLA supplied directly to athletics is separated from revenue the department generated through media, tickets, sponsorships and donors.
Seven consecutive deficit years through fiscal 2025 add up to $241.1 million in reported shortfalls. The figure describes accumulated annual losses rather than a current unpaid bill of the same size. UCLA has covered those deficits through university support, and Frenk said in May that $50 million from the Under Armour settlement would help reduce the athletics burden.
Travel Was Expensive, but It Wasn’t the Whole Problem
Travel was the obvious risk when UCLA joined a league stretching from Los Angeles to New Jersey. Pac-12 commissioner George Kliavkoff, who was trying to keep UCLA in his conference, warned UC Regents in 2022 that annual travel could rise by $8.1 million with commercial flights and by as much as $23.7 million with heavy charter use.
The first-year increase came in much lower. UCLA’s travel bill rose from $9.5 million in its final Pac-12 season to $14.5 million in its first Big Ten season, and roughly $2 million of the increase came from nonconference trips to Hawaii and LSU. Jarmond later told the Regents that UCLA expected to finish below the additional $5 million it had budgeted for Big Ten travel.
UCLA’s expense growth reached far beyond airfare. Game and travel expenses increased from $24.2 million in fiscal 2023 to $33.1 million in 2025, while non-coaching staff compensation climbed from $23.6 million to $31.8 million.
Then two more expenses entered the picture. UC Regents ordered UCLA to pay Cal $10 million a year for three years because the move widened the expected conference-revenue gap between the campuses. After the House settlement, UCLA committed to the full $20.5 million athlete revenue-sharing allowance beginning July 1, 2025.
Jarmond said UCLA chose the maximum to “continue to compete at an elite level”. Paying less would reduce expenses, but it could leave UCLA at a recruiting disadvantage against Big Ten programs willing to use the full amount. UCLA entered its second Big Ten year with a richer media contract and another competitive cost coming onto the books.
UCLA Was Losing Ground on the Money It Had to Sell Itself
The conference can negotiate television rights for UCLA. It cannot sell Rose Bowl seats, convince boosters to donate, or close sponsorship deals in Los Angeles. Those revenue streams became the more uncomfortable part of UCLA’s financial story.
Ticket sales fell from $20.2 million in fiscal 2023 to $18.3 million in 2025. Donations slipped from $15.6 million to $13.5 million. Sponsorship, advertising, and licensing revenue fell from $18.3 million to $10.6 million. Conference and NCAA money rose 88% during those two years, while several revenue streams UCLA had to generate closer to home were shrinking.
Donor giving had been sliding for longer, from $18.5 million in fiscal 2022 to $13.5 million three years later. By fiscal 2025, UCLA ranked 14th among the 16 public Big Ten schools in donor contributions. Public complaints added context, although Frenk never said donor dissatisfaction caused Jarmond’s dismissal.
If you are looking for why a program in Los Angeles can still struggle to generate local cash, the Rose Bowl arrangement is a useful place to start. UCLA rents the stadium and does not control the suite and club-level revenue that many major programs can sell themselves. Jarmond told the UC Regents in May 2025 that the missing premium-seat opportunity costs UCLA an estimated $15 million to $25 million each year.
UCLA chief financial officer Stephen Agostini explained the effect at the same Regents meeting. When conference media distributions become similar across member schools, he said, revenue from facilities and other local opportunities becomes “really critical to your bottom line”. Big Ten money could strengthen UCLA’s conference revenue, while the university still had to build the business around it.
The Harris Inherits the Business the Big Ten Could Not Fix
UCLA extended Jarmond through 2029 in November 2024 and praised his role in the Big Ten move. Less than two years later, Frenk removed him with roughly $6.5 million remaining on the deal. Jarmond also left nine NCAA championships across six sports, including the 2026 women’s basketball title.
Frenk’s choice of replacement points toward UCLA’s next priority. Tim Harris is a UCLA alumnus and former soccer player who worked for the Los Angeles Lakers for more than 35 years, most recently as president of business operations. His portfolio included sponsorships, ticketing, broadcasting, marketing, and corporate partnerships. Harris began the UCLA role without a salary before Frenk made him the permanent CEO and director of athletics in September, while the university worked on a long-term agreement.
Frenk also shifted control over commercial use of UCLA’s marks away from a student-run organization, ending an arrangement that had lasted roughly six decades. The change could send more licensing revenue toward athletics.
Frenk wants an athletic department that “supports itself through the revenue it generates”. UCLA’s next NCAA financial report is due Jan. 15, 2027, and it will begin to show the first year of athlete revenue sharing, another $10 million Cal payment and the next stage of Big Ten economics. Harris will have had only a few months to work on the revenue streams UCLA can influence closer to home. The next filing will show how much of the remaining problem moved with him.
